Abstract. Estonia is the only country in the world where all voters can vote online in national elections. In the 2015 election, 31% of voters did so. This paper discusses the sociology and politics of online voting in Estonia. I first show that online voting is a partisan project. Liberal, conservative, and social democratic parties support online voting as a way of modernizing the electoral system, while populist and agrarian parties oppose it as a tool for political manipulation. I then show that online voting is demographically and politically biased. Online voters are more urban, richer, and better-educated than conventional voters and non-voters. The opposition left-populist Center Party receives fewer votes online than the governing market-liberal Reform Party. This is a bad thing for democracy and Estonia should discontinue online voting.
Introduction: Winter tale
On March 1, 2015, Estonia held a parliamentary election, the seventh since it regained its independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. For most of the 64% of eligible voters who participated in the poll, this meant walking, driving, or taking a bus to a polling station at a nearby school, public library, or shopping mall. The weather was unusually good for late winter in Estonia, with temperatures around 0 • C and light winds. However, rain and sleet fell in parts of the country and the roads and sidewalks were slippery. This made getting to the polls a time-consuming ordeal for many older and rural voters in this small but sparsely populated country, especially if they did not own a car. Inside the polling station, they had to wait in line with coughing and sneezing people as it was the peak of the flu season.
However, for 31% of the voters, voting was a much more pleasant experience [47] . Between 19 and 25 February, they turned on a computer in their home, office, or any other place with an internet connection. They then opened the website of the electoral committee -www.valimised.ee -and downloaded the voting application, a file named rk2015.exe. They also inserted their national ID card into the card reader linked to their computer and typed in a PIN. Finally, they clicked on the name of their favorite candidate from a list displayed on the computer screen and typed in a second PIN. If they wanted, they could also request a smartphone message confirming their vote. Barring technical errors, the process took only a few minutes.
Most studies paint a highly favorable picture of online voting in Estonia, the only country that allows all voters to vote online in national elections. First, Estonia is said to have designed a voting technology that is cheap and simple to use yet secure and private [1, 8, [23] [24] [25] 27] . All Estonians are required by law to hold a national ID card that has a microchip with identifying information. They are also issued two PIN codes. The combination of machine-readable ID cards and PINs makes it difficult for one person to vote for another. The online voting system also uses a system of digital "double envelopes." One server verifies the voters' identity and receives and encrypts their vote. Another server, which is unconnected to the first, decrypts the votes and counts them. As a result, the government cannot easily change election results or find out how people voted.
Second, online voting is said to be demographically representative and politically neutral [1, 10, 11, 25, 45, 46, 50, 51] . Different social groups -the rich and the poor, the educated and the uneducated, the urban and the rural residents -are equally likely to vote online. The only exception here is age: young people are more likely to vote online than old people. However, it is a good thing if young people have started voting online because few of them vote offline. Likewise, online voting does not discriminate politically: left and right parties do equally well online and offline, at least when we control for demographic variables. Moreover, any demographic and political biases that may have existed when online voting was first introduced have disappeared over time as more people have started voting online.
The technology used in online voting in Estonia been examined by Springall et al. [42] , who replicated the Estonian e-voting software and conducted attacks on it in a lab. They found that it is insecure on both the server side and the client side. It is easy to infect home or office computers with a virus that steals the users' identifying information and changes their vote. It is impossible for voters to verify whether their vote was recorded correctly because there is no paper trail, while malware can be used to send out fake confirmation messages to voters' smartphones. The server of the electoral commission can be infected with a virus that miscounts votes. Finally, there is no way of recounting the vote because online votes are destroyed after the election.
This paper analyzes the sociology and politics of online voting in Estonia. Using records of parliamentary debates and court cases, I first show that online voting is a partisan project. Liberal, conservative, and social democratic parties support online voting as a way of modernizing the electoral system, while populist and agrarian parties oppose it as a tool for political manipulation. Using survey data, I then show that online voting is demographically and politically biased. Online voting reinforces the demographic bias in voting because online voters are more urban, richer, and better-educated than conventional voters and non-voters. Online voting also introduces a political bias into voting because the main opposition party, the left-populist Center Party, receives fewer votes online than the main governing party, the market-liberal Reform Party. These biases become stronger, not weaker, over time. This is a bad thing for democracy and Estonia should discontinue online voting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the legal and political history of online voting in Estonia. The following section analyzes survey data from the 2007 and 2011 national elections in Estonia. The conclusion summarizes my argument and provides policy recommendations.
Tiger leap
A small and relatively poor country, Estonia may seem like an unlikely champion of electronic government and online voting. However, science and technology have traditionally enjoyed high respect in the Protestant, practical-minded Estonia [26] . In the 1960s, Estonia founded one of the first institutes of cybernetics in the Soviet Union and the only one specializing in computer programming. After the collapse of Communism, Estonian computer scientists developed innovative products for Western markets, such as the file-sharing program Kazaa and the teleconferencing system Skype [39] . Estonian banks introduced online banking earlier than their Western counterparts because it was cheaper than setting up branch offices, while Estonian consumers had not developed the habit of writing checks [17, 22] . The PIN cards issued by banks became the prototype for the national digital ID card developed in the 2000s [20] . However, the Estonian state also played an important role in the development of the country's information technology sector [8, 33] . In the 1990s it launched a program called "tiger leap" that provided all Estonian schools with computers and an internet connection. In the 2000s, it moved many public services online, beginning with the Electronic Tax Board. Today, Estonians can renew their driver's license, register a business, apply for family benefits, and sign up for health and pension insurance on the internet [13] . 1 The government also actively uses the internet in its own work. All cabinet meetings are paperless as ministers review bills, make amendments, and vote online. Most draft laws are available online and citizens can comment on them or propose their own ideas. 2 In 2002, the Estonian government, in cooperation with the Open Society Institute and the United Nations Development Program, established an e-Governance Academy that develops online solutions for Estonia and exports them to other countries [4] . As a result of these policies, Estonians are the most avid users of internet in Eastern Europe, as Table 1 shows.
The most important step towards the development of electronic government Estonia, however, was the system of digital identification introduced in 2002 [8, 20, 33] . All Estonian citizens and residents are required to hold a physical identification card that also includes a microchip with basic demographic information, such as the person's name and national identification number. The user also gets two PINs, one for authentication and the other for digital signature. These cards replaced most other ID cards issued by the government, such as health insurance cards, and were soon adopted by banks in lieu of their own cards. They are also convenient for online shopping because both the buyer and the seller can verify each other's identity. All that is needed to use the card is a networked computer and a smart card reader, which can be purchased at post offices, banks, and supermarkets for as little as $10-20.
In this context, online voting seemed like a natural extension of electronic government. In 2002, the Estonian parliament voted to allow online voting as an alternative to conventional voting in local, national, and European elections and in national referenda. All parties supported the idea, perhaps because it was not clear whether online voting would be technically feasible or whom it would benefit [3] . By 2005, however, Cybernetica, a private company founded on the basis of the Institute of Cybernetics, developed the online voting software [13] . 3 The parliament then voted to allow online voting in that year's local election. The bill was supported by the liberal Reform Party, the conservative Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica, and the social liberal Social Democratic Party as a way of modernizing the Estonian electoral system and increasing voter turnout. The agrarian People's Union and the left-populist Center Party opposed the law, arguing that it would encourage parties to buy votes and allow the government to falsify election results [34, 35] .
The agrarian president Arnold Rüütel refused to sign the law and referred it to the Supreme Court for constitutional review [29] . He argued that online voting violated the principle of uniform elections: online voters could change their vote as many times as they wanted, while conventional voters could not. The Court upheld the law on the grounds that the principle of uniformity was not absolute: for example, Estonia already allowed early voting at polling stations. Moreover, the freedom to vote was as important as the uniformity of elections. Since online voting took place outside polling stations, voters might be watched or forced to vote in a particular way. The only way to prevent this was to allow online voters to change their vote. 4 Finally, the constitution did not prohibit the parliament from changing the electoral law to take advantage of technological changes, such as the development of the internet [36] .
Based on the Court's ruling, Estonia held the first online poll in the 2005 local election, but only 2% of voters took advantage of this option [25] . In 2006, however, the parliament voted to allow online voting in the next national election, an important step in a small and centralized country like Estonia where the national parliament, elected every four years under proportional representation, makes major policy decisions [1, 45] . In the 2007 national election, 6% of voters voted online, suggesting that Estonians were willing to try the new method. In the 2011 national election, online voting took off, as 24% of all votes were cast online. In the 2015 national elections, online voting increased further, to 31% of the electorate (see Table 2 ).
As the number of online voters increased, so did voter turnout. In 2003, the last paper-only election, 58% of eligible voters turned out; in 2015, the most recent poll, 64% did (see Table 2 ). It is not clear if online voting was the cause of the increase in turnout. Voters who live far from the polling station are more likely to vote online than voters who live close to the station, but many of them may have voted in conventional elections before and switched to online voting because it was more convenient [41] . Young people are more likely to vote online than old people, but turnout remains lower among young people than old people [46] . However, 10-15% of online voters tell pollsters that they would not vote at all if they could not vote online [1, 45, 46, 50] . This suggests that online voting has mobilized some new voters.
However, a clear political pattern also emerged beginning with the 2007 national election. The majority of online voters supported the Reform Party and the Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica (see Table 3 ). The Social Democrats, the environmentalist but pro-market Greens, who were represented in the parliament in 2007-2011, and the anti-establishment but liberal Free Party, which won seats in 2015, also did better online than offline, but by a smaller margin. By contrast, the Center Party and the People's Union, which lost parliamentary representation in 2011, received very few votes online, while the nationalist Conservative People's Party, which gained representation in 2015, did somewhat worse online than offline. 5 The gap was biggest for the Center Party, which received 27-32% of the conventional vote in the 2007-2015 parliamentary elections, but only 8-10% of the online vote.
The discrepancy between online and offline election results reignited the legal debate about online voting. After the 2011 election, the Center Party, led by the charismatic but controversial mayor of Tallinn, Edgar Savisaar, asked the Supreme Court to annul the results of the election. It argued that online voting was insecure, citing an experiment where a student created a virus to change his own vote during a pre-election test of the system and a case from one electoral district where voters could not see the name of a candidate online. 6 The Court disagreed, holding that that there was no evidence that any votes had been changed during the election and that voters who experienced technical difficulties online could always vote offline [37] . In 2013, the Center Party appealed the ruling to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that online voting violated the right to vote in free and fair elections guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights [14] .
Largely missing in this debate over security and legality, however, is an obvious political question. Is online voting demographically representative and politically neutral or does it benefit some parties and social groups at the expense of others? 
Right choices
To answer this question, I will use data from the 2007 and 2011 Estonian National Election Study (ENES). 7 Conducted every election year since 2003, ENES is the main survey of electoral behavior in Estonia. However, much of the literature on online voting in Estonia is based on a survey that oversamples online voters based on a list of online voters provided by the Estonian National Electoral Committee [1, 10, 25, 35, 41, 46, 50, 51] , although some recent studies also incorporate ENES in their analysis [41, 50, 51] . By contrast, ENES uses a stratified random sample of the population, which makes it more representative of the voting -and non-voting -public. The regression results for voter turnout are reported in Table 4 . Clearly, voters are not representative of the Estonian population as a whole. In 2007, though not in 2011, ethnic Estonians were more likely to vote than ethnic Russians, which is not surprising because many Russians (still) do not have Estonian citizenship and, therefore, cannot vote in national elections. 9 Turnout was also higher among the educated, the rich (in 2011), and the urban residents (in 2007) than the uneducated, the poor, and the rural residents, perhaps because they understand better how political issues are linked to their personal interests. Finally, old people were more likely to vote than young people, perhaps because they came of age under Communism when voting was compulsory. However, while non-voters were less likely to identify with a political party than voters, identification with any particular party did not predict whether a person would vote or not, except for people who felt close to the Center Party in 2007, who were less likely to vote than people who felt close to the Reform Party.
But what, if anything, distinguishes online voters from conventional voters? As Table 5 shows, online voters are significantly younger than conventional voters. Since young people vote less than old people, this makes the electorate more representative of the population. Ethnic Russians are as likely to vote online as ethnic Estonians, perhaps because they have equally good access to the internet, even if their political rights are limited. However, in other ways, online voting makes the electorate less representative of the population, especially in 2011, when nearly a quarter of the electorate voted online. Thus, the poor, the uneducated, and the rural residents are even less likely to vote online than offline, perhaps because they do not have access to the internet or do not know how to use it. Online voting also introduces a political bias into voting: even controlling for demographic variables, the left-populist Center Party receives significantly fewer votes online than the market-liberal Reform Party.
This raises an interesting question: why does the Center Party do worse online than offline? The Centrist leaders have argued that the government, which has been led by the Reform Party since 2005, coerces voters and falsifies election results [40] . This possibility cannot be discounted because some politicians in the Reform Party have used online voting to manipulate the results of intraparty elections. In 2011, party officials used the ID numbers and (fake) e-mail addresses of senior citizens to vote for certain candidates in elections to the party executive [21] . When the person held responsible, Member of European Parliament Kristiina Ojuland, was expelled from the party, she revealed that the party leadership kept a list of whether party members had voted for Prime Minister Andrus Ansip in the supposedly secret online elections for the party chairman in 2013 [28] . While Ms. Ojuland's political career has ended, Mr. Ansip is now the European Commission's Vice President for Digital Single Market.
However, it is more likely that Centrist voters do not know how to vote online and do not trust online voting. The Center Party receives above-average support from old, poor, and uneducated voters [19, 44] . Many of these voters do not have a computer and do not know how to use the internet [32] . Therefore, they could not vote online even if they wanted to do so. Moreover, the Center Party has consistently opposed online voting as a tool for electoral manipulation. As a result, Centrist voters may believe that their vote would be miscounted or discarded online or recorded in a government database for reprisals. Such voters would not vote online even if they were sick or out of town or did not have transportation to the polling station, biasing election results against the Centrists.
Conclusion: Net losses
Estonia is the only country in the world where all voters can vote online in national elections. In the most recent (2015) election, 31% of the voters did so. This has created a lively debate about the technical and legal aspects of online voting. Is online as secure as conventional voting or does it allow corrupt politicians and clever hackers to manipulate election results? Does online voting expand electoral choices for citizens or violate the constitutional right to the secret ballot? Less has been written about the politics of online voting. Is online voting demographically representative and politically neutral or does it benefit some social groups and political parties at the expense of others?
This paper has explored the politics and sociology of online voting in Estonia. I found that online voting is supported by liberal, conservative, and social democratic parties and opposed by populist and agrarian parties. I also found online voting reinforces the socio-economic bias in voting because online voters are more urban, richer, and better-educated than conventional voters and, especially, non-voters. Online voting also introduces a political bias into voting because the governing market-liberal Reform Party receives significantly more votes online than the opposition left-populist Center Party, even controlling for demographic variables. These biases have become stronger, not weaker, over time.
What, then, is to be done about online voting? Ideally, Estonia should discontinue online voting. Existing research in computer science has found that the voting technology used in Estonia is insecure because both the server of the electoral commission and individual computers can be easily infected with viruses that change or miscount votes. In its legal challenge to online voting in the Estonian Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights, the Center Party argues that online voting violates the right to free and fair elections enshrined in the Estonian Constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This paper has argued that there is another problem with online voting in Estonia: it is demographically and politically biased against rural, poor, and uneducated voters and the Center Party.
If Estonia plans to continue with online voting, it should also make it easier for voters to cast conventional ballots to level the playing field for different parties and social groups. As a legacy of the Soviet period, the elderly, the sick, and people lacking means of transportation can request that the ballot box be brought to their home. However, they must make this request in writing [48] . A phone call should suffice because the Estonian Post is closing offices in small towns and rural areas. The government should also have the same rules for online and offline political advertising. Currently, outdoor advertising (e.g., on billboards) must stop 40 days before the election, while no advertising is allowed on radio or television on the election day [49] . However, online advertising continues during the week allotted for online voting [30] . Limiting the time during which online ads can be broadcast would allow online voters to cast their vote undisturbed.
Other post-Communist and developing countries should learn from Estonia and avoid online voting. In 2015, however, Lithuania decided to introduce online voting, while Kosovo, Moldova, Mongolia, and Myanmar have consulted Estonia's e-Governance Academy about doing so [2, 5, 6, 31] . This is disturbing. All four countries have lower levels of internet penetration than Estonia, which would bias online voting even more heavily against rural, poor, and uneducated voters. 10 Unlike Estonia, Lithuania and Mongolia use mixed electoral systems where some members of parliament are elected in single-member districts. 11 As a result, even small differences in the number of votes could lead to large differences in election results and, hence, lengthy legal battles over online voting. Finally, Kosovo, Moldova, and Myanmar are authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states, where governments falsify election results, harass political opponents, and coerce voters. 12 Online voting would enable them to do so more efficiently.
